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This paper uses an unusual pay reform to test the responsiveness of investment in schooling to 
changes in redistribution schemes that increase the rate of return to education. We exploit an 
episode where different Israeli kibbutzim shifted from equal sharing to productivity-based wages 
in different years and find that students in kibbutzim that reformed earlier invested more in high 
school education. This effect is stronger for males and is largely driven by students whose parents 
have lower levels of education. We also show that, in the long run, students in kibbutzim that 
reformed earlier were more likely to complete post-high school academic colleges. Our findings 
support the prediction that education is highly responsive to changes in the redistribution policy, 
especially for students from weaker backgrounds. 
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We study a unique episode where some kibbutzim (plural of kibbutz) changed their 
decades-long policy of setting wages independent of an individual’s human capital to setting 
wages to reflect the market rate of return. This sharp change in the redistributive policy from 
equal sharing to pay-for-productivity introduced a dramatic increase in the returns to schooling 
for kibbutz members. We test whether and to what extent this policy change induced high school 
students to invest more in their education, as reflected by their academic achievements during 
high school and in adulthood.  
We use administrative records collected by the Israeli Ministry of Education for six 
consecutive cohorts (from 1995 to 2000) of 10th grade students, following them to graduation, 
combined with National Social Security Administrative data on completed years of higher 
education when individuals in our sample were 28 to 33 years old.  One important outcome we 
examine is whether the student passed all the matriculation exams successfully and got a 
matriculation diploma (equivalent to a baccalaureate diploma in most European countries), which 
is necessary for post-high school education in Israel and yields a substantial earning premium in 
the general Israeli labor market. Other outcomes of interest are whether the student graduated 
high school, her average score in the matriculation exams, and whether her diploma meets the 
university entrance requirements. We then study whether, in the long run, these students enrolled 
in post-high school education of various types and how many years of schooling they completed.   
Our identification strategy relies on the fact that the pay reform was not implemented in 
all kibbutzim in the same year. We use a difference-in-differences approach, comparing 
educational outcomes of high school students in kibbutzim that reformed early (1998-2000) and 
late (2003-2004), before and after the early reforms. We show evidence that students in early-
reforming (the treatment group) and late-reforming kibbutzim (control group) are very similar in 
their observable background characteristics and in their pre-reform schooling outcomes.  
Overall, we find that students in kibbutzim that reformed early experienced an 
improvement in all high school outcomes. For example, the mean score in the matriculation 
exams (Bagrut) increased by 3.55 points (0.17 standard deviations of the test score distribution) 
and the university qualified Bagrut rate by 6.0 percentage points (about 12 percent). We further 
show that the effect is mainly driven by students in kibbutzim that reformed to a larger degree. 
This total positive effect of the reform on educational outcomes appears to be largely driven by 
males and by the subgroups of students who have less educated parents.  
In the long term, we show that students in kibbutzim that reformed early were on average 
4.3 percentage points more likely to enroll in higher education in the form of academic or 
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teachers’ colleges during the decade following the reform, and gained on average 0.2 additional 
years of college schooling during this period.  
This paper contributes to two strands of the literature. From a public economics 
perspective, this paper sheds light on the extent to which redistributive policy influences long run 
labor supply, as mediated through educational choices. While it is well known that changes in 
taxes affect labor supply decisions in the short run (Saez, Slemrod and Giertz 2009), much less is 
known about how such changes affect labor supply decisions in the long run, because it is 
difficult to identify empirically how such tax changes affect educational choices. This paper fills 
this gap by studying how responsive educational choices are to tax changes.  
From a labor economics perspective, economic models of optimal human capital 
investment (Ben Porath 1967) suggest that the level of investment in schooling is expected to 
increase in the perceived rate of return to education.1 However, despite its centrality in modern 
labor economics, this fundamental assumption has hardly been tested empirically, both because 
variation across individuals in the rate of return to schooling is rarely observed and because sharp 
changes in this return rarely occur.2
While the pay reform in kibbutzim sharply increased the returns to schooling, it could 
influence schooling outcomes through two other channels. First, via the reduction in social 
incentives for encouraging education that had been used under equal sharing (pre reform). Under 
equal sharing, the kibbutz provided members with various services and communal organization, 
and members might have felt indebted to their kibbutz and invested in education for the common 
cause. Such social norms would be reduced following the pay reform. Second, via the changes in 
income levels of parents, which might affect education decisions through liquidity constraints, 
because children’s education is a normal good, or through the concavity of utility in income 
assuming some intergenerational transfers. Our paper cannot fully disentangle these mechanisms, 
 Moreover, as far as we know, ours is the first study to 
document the short- and long-run responses to an increase in the rate of return to schooling.  
                                                 
1 Note simple models of investment in education, such as presented in Eaton and Rosen (1980), show that, 
when the only cost of education is the opportunity cost of foregone earnings, a proportional change in the 
income tax rate does not affect private incentives to invest in education. However, because education 
inevitably involves effort costs and likely other costs besides, theory predicts that the change in income tax 
rates that we study will affect investment in education. 
2 Freeman (1976) and Kane (1994) find a positive response of schooling investments to increased returns. 
However, the limitation of these studies is that they are primarily based on a coincidence of time series, 
namely the similar timing of a rise in returns to education and a rise in college entry. Therefore a causal 
interpretation of the association between returns and college enrollment is difficult to establish. Several 
studies estimate the perceived rate of return to schooling, and then assess its effect on schooling (Betts 
1996)). Jensen (2010) find that students who were better informed (experimentally) of higher returns were 
significantly less likely to drop out of school in subsequent years. Attanasio and Kaufman (2009) find that 
college attendance decisions depend on expected returns to college.  
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but we provide suggestive evidence that the returns to education channel operated above and 
beyond the social incentives channels, and that the income channel played only a limited role.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section presents a brief 
background of kibbutzim and the pay reform, and of the Israeli high school system. Section III 
describes the data and discusses the empirical framework and identification strategy. Section IV 
presents the results on the effect of the reform on high school outcomes, section V presents the 
results on the long term effect on post-high school education, and section VI concludes. 
 
II. Brief Background 
The pay reform in kibbutzim: Kibbutzim are voluntary communities that have provided their 
members with a high degree of income equality for almost a century.3
The episode that we study is a unique pay reform that kibbutzim in Israel adopted 
beginning in 1998. During the following years, many kibbutzim shifted from equal sharing by 
introducing compensation schemes based on members’ productivity, which created a link 
between productivity and earnings in kibbutzim for the first time. These pay reforms were a 
response to changing external pressures and circumstances facing kibbutzim. Some contributing 
factors were a decline in world prices of agricultural goods, bad financial management, and a 
high-tech boom during the mid-1990s, which increased members’ outside options considerably. 
Perhaps the biggest problem was the 1985 stabilization program in Israel following a few years of 
high inflation, which raised interest rates dramatically and left many kibbutzim with huge debts 
they could not repay. As a result, living standards in many kibbutzim fell substantially, members 
left in large numbers during the late 1980s and early 1990s, and talk about a major reform of 
kibbutz life began.  
 Traditionally, all kibbutzim 
were based on full income sharing between members. Specifically, each member of a kibbutz was 
paid an equal wage, regardless of her contribution to the community. Kibbutz members who 
worked outside their kibbutz brought their salaries in, and these were split equally among 
members. This meant that monetary returns to ability and effort were close to zero.  
In reformed kibbutzim, members’ wages reflected market wages. Members who worked 
outside their kibbutzim (about a quarter of all members) largely kept the wages they received 
from their employers. Members who worked inside received wages based on the wages of non-
kibbutz workers of similar occupation, education, skills, and experience. A kibbutz ‘tax’ was 
deducted from these gross wages to guarantee older members and very low wage earners in the 
                                                 
3 For a history of kibbutzim, see Near (1992, 1997), Abramitzky (2011). 
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kibbutz a safety net (i.e. a minimum wage).4 The pay reform was essentially a sharp decrease in 
the income tax rate. Before the reform, the income tax rate in kibbutzim was 100%. Post reform, 
the tax rates in kibbutzim became more similar to the Israeli tax rates. Specifically, kibbutz 
members faced a progressive tax system, with marginal tax rates ranging from 20 to 50%.5
The pay reform was also highly salient. The move from equal sharing to differential pay 
strongly signaled an increase in the financial rewards for human capital to young adults. This 
increase in the return to skills was noticeable within a family, as students’ parents experienced a 
decrease or increase in their earnings depending on their skills. Moreover, with the 
implementation of the reforms, kibbutz members received detailed information about the new 
sharing rule and how earnings were now going to be linked to productivity and reflect market 
forces. The productivity-based sharing rules were hotly debated by members in the kibbutzim and 
the reforms also received a lot of attention in the media both in Israel and abroad.  
   
The Israeli high school system: When entering high school (10th grade), students choose 
whether to enroll in the academic or non-academic track. Students enrolled in the academic track 
obtain a matriculation certificate (Bagrut) if they pass a series of national exams in core and 
elective subjects taken between 10th and 12th grade. Students choose to be tested at various 
proficiency levels, with each test awarding one to five credit units per subject, depending on 
difficulty. Advanced level subjects are those subjects taken at a level of four or five credit units; a 
minimum of 20 credit units is required to qualify for a Bagrut certificate. About 52 percent of all 
high school seniors received a Bagrut in the 1999 and 2000 cohorts (Israel Ministry of Education, 
2001). The Bagrut is a prerequisite for university admission and receiving it is an economically 
important educational milestone. For more details on the Israeli high school system, see Angrist 
and Lavy (2009). 
 
III. Data and Estimation 
The empirical analysis is based on a sample that includes students who live in kibbutzim at the 
start of 10th grade, and on information drawn from several administrative data files obtained from 
the Ministry of Education in Israel. We obtained data for six consecutive cohorts (from 1995 to 
                                                 
4 Traditionally, kibbutzim paid income taxes to the government based on members’ average income.  
5 Data we collected on two particular kibbutzim that are currently reforming their pay systems, presented in 
Online Appendix Table A1, illustrate that before the reform members of all education levels earned the 
same wage, but post reform more educated members earned higher wages in these kibbutzim. Pooling 
observations from these two fully reformed kibbutzim, Online Appendix Table A2 documents the large 
returns to schooling after the pay reform, around 8% per year of schooling, which is the same as the returns 
for the country as a whole. Members’ exit option and non-monetary returns to education (prestige, social 
norms) likely cause us to overstate the increase in returns due to the pay reforms. These are discussed in the 
working paper version. 
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2000) of 10th grade students. Each record contains an individual, a school and a class identifier, 
student date of birth, gender, parental education, number of siblings, year of immigration, 
ethnicity and schooling outcomes (graduating high school, receiving a Bagrut, receiving a Bagrut 
that meets university entrance requirements6
 We use a difference-in-differences (DID) approach comparing educational outcomes of 
high school students in kibbutzim that reformed early (1998-2000, treatment group) vs. late 
(2003-2004, control group), before and after the early reforms (but before the late reforms).
 and the average score in the matriculation exams). 
We link these student-level data with additional data collected by the Institute for Research of the 
Kibbutz and the Cooperative Idea (Getz 1998-2004) on the date at which each kibbutz reformed. 
Table A3 in Online Appendix presents the number of kibbutzim that reformed and number of 
students by year of reform. We also use data on post-high school educational outcomes that we 













In section IV.c. we take a more continuous treatment approach by exploiting the time-varying 
“intensity” of the reform. The difference between pre- and post-reform cohorts in the treatment 
kibbutzim relative to control kibbutzim can be modeled as in the following simple DID 
regression:  
                   (1) 
where Yikc is the achievement outcome of student i in kibbutz k in cohort c, are cohort 
dummies (for students starting high school in 1995, 1996, 1999 and 2000), 
                                                 
6 A Bagrut that meets university entrance requirement is one that contains at least 4 credits in English and 
another subject at a level of 4 or 5 credits.  
7 We exclude kibbutzim that reformed in 2001-2002 to avoid anticipation effects (see discussion in section 
II).  
year 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
treatment kibbutzim  
reformed 
control kibbutzim  
reformed 
pre-reform cohort 
in 10th grade 
post-reform cohort 
in 10th grade 
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 denotes whether the student belonged to a kibbutz that implemented the 
reform early, and  is the interaction of interest, namely 
whether the student belonged to the affected (post-reform) cohort and lived in a kibbutz that 
reformed early. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the kibbutz level. We also estimate a 
specification that includes kibbutz fixed effects, cohort fixed effects, and a vector of the student’s 
background characteristics, as follows: 
                                         (2)     
where  are kibbutz fixed effects,  are student i’s characteristics, and the rest of the 
variables are as in equation (1). Note that when comparing pre- and post-reform students, the 
kibbutz fixed effects essentially also capture school fixed effects because almost all students from 
the same kibbutz attend the same high school. Note also that kibbutz children typically go to high 
schools located outside of kibbutzim, together with children from other kibbutzim and from 
villages. This means that the effects we document are due to the behavioral responses of students 
rather than changes in the quality of the educational system.  
The identifying assumption of our strategy is that the exact timing of the reform is 
unrelated to potential outcomes of students. This assumption implies that older cohorts of early- 
and late-reforming (treatment and control) kibbutzim should have had similar high school 
outcomes on average. We next provide evidence in support of the research strategy and this 
identification assumption. 
Are the control and treatment groups observationally equivalent? Here we test directly 
whether the students in the treatment and control groups (comprising 74 and 33 kibbutzim, 
respectively, see Table A3 in the Online Appendix) are statistically indistinguishable in terms of 
their observed characteristics for two pre-reform cohorts (10th graders in 1995 and 1996, 1,701 
students in total), both separately and jointly, and for the post-reform cohorts (10th graders in 
1999 and 2000, 1,648 students). For the pre-reform cohorts we also check whether their academic 
high school matriculation outcomes are similar. Panel A of Table 1 shows that student 
background characteristics are very similar in the treatment and control groups, both for the pre 
and post cohorts. Out of the 16 estimated differences in background characteristics, the only ones 
that are significant (at the 10% level of significance) are the difference in mother’s years of 
schooling in the pre-reform sample and the difference in proportion of students of 
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European/American ethnic origin in the post-reform sample.8
Were the control and treatment kibbutzim on different pre-reform time trends? We use pre-
reform data from 1993 to 1998 to estimate differential time trends in outcomes for treatment and 
control kibbutzim. The unit of observation in this analysis is a kibbutz-year. First, we estimate a 
constant linear time trend model while allowing for an interaction of the constant linear trend 
with the treatment indicator. We also include specifications with the main effect for the treatment 
group instead of kibbutz fixed effects. Second, we estimate a model where we replace the linear 
time trend variable with a series of year dummies and include in the regression an interaction of 
each of these cohort dummies with the treatment indicator. The estimates from both models 
suggest that there is a time trend in the educational outcomes used, but this trend is identical for 
treatment and control kibbutzim. These results are presented in Table 2 for the mean 
matriculation rate and Bagrut mean test score (two representative outcomes; the evidence for the 
other outcomes is identical). The mean trend is an annual increase of 0.025 in the matriculation 
rate and a 1.225 point annual increase in test scores. The estimated coefficient on the interaction 
of this trend with the treatment indicator is practically zero in both cases. Moreover, the estimated 
coefficient of the treatment indicator main effect is zero in both cases, again confirming the 
balancing tests’ results on pre-reform outcomes presented in Table 1. The evidence presented in 
the cohort dummies model is fully consistent with the linear trend model. The interaction terms of 
the treatment indicator with the year dummies are all small and not significantly different from 
zero; we also note that some are positive and others are negative, lacking any consistent pattern. 
This conclusion is supported by the fact that based on the F tests presented in the table we cannot 
reject the hypothesis that all the interaction terms are jointly equal to zero. We conclude that both 
groups were on a similar time trend of educational matriculation outcomes in the six years prior 
to the reform. 
 Similarly small and insignificant 
differences in pre-reform mean outcomes of the control and treatment groups in 1995/1996 are 
presented in Panel B of Table 1.  We conclude that students in the treatment and control groups 
are similar in their mean background characteristics and pre-reform mean schooling outcomes. 
Did the control and treatment kibbutzim experience different exit or entry rates? We 
address this concern by checking whether the likelihood that a student leaves or enters a kibbutz 
is associated with the timing of the reform in his kibbutz. We define a student as exiting if he 
                                                 
8 In Online Appendix Tables A4-A11 we present additional evidence on the well balanced comparison 
between the treatment and control group. This includes comparison based on including all background 
characteristics jointly in the regression and F tests for the joint significance, balancing for each cohort 
separately.  We also compare treatment and control separately for kibbutzim that implemented full reform 
and those that implemented a partial reform.  
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lived in his kibbutz at the start of the 10th grade and lived outside it at the end of the 12th grade.9 
We define a student as entering if he did not live in his kibbutz at the start of the 10th grade and 
lived in by the end of the 12th grade. We estimate whether there is such a differential exit or entry 
rate for the pre-treatment (1995-96) and post treatment sample (1999-2000). Panel C of Table 1 
shows that the likelihood that a student leaves or enters his kibbutz is relatively low and unrelated 
to the implementation of the pay reform: the DID in exit and entry rates are essentially zero, and 
exit and entry rates remained the same over time in both the treatment and control groups.10
Are kibbutzim that never reformed an appropriate comparison group? Kibbutzim that never 
reformed differ from those that did in that they had different experiences in the decade leading to 
the reform period (Abramitzky 2008). Specifically, kibbutzim that reformed experienced a deeper 
financial crisis and higher exit rates in the decade leading to the reform. Subsequently, kibbutzim 
that never reformed formed the “egalitarian/communal wave” (zerem shitufi) that revived the 
traditional egalitarian norms by instilling communal and equality norms in members, opposed the 
reforms in other kibbutzim and proudly became “the only kibbutzim like in the good old days”. 
These kibbutzim have often become even more successful economically and socially. There are 
thus reasons to believe kibbutzim that didn’t reform strengthened their group identity and social 
norms, which may have improved educational outcomes through a different channel. Empirically, 
in Online Appendix Tables A12-A14 we present versions of these three tests that compare 
treatment kibbutzim with kibbutzim that never reformed. We show a large and significant 
difference in exit rates of the post-reform cohort, and significant differences in some of the 
students’ observable characteristics. These results suggest students in kibbutzim that never 
reformed differ from the early reformers in ways that make them an inappropriate comparison 
group. We also show in Online Appendix Tables A15 that kibbutzim that reformed in 2001-2002 
had a larger and significant exit rate among the 1999 and 2000 10th grade cohorts, which suggests 
that it is preferable not to use these kibbutzim as a control group.  
  
Were there anticipation effects? We cannot rule out that members in kibbutzim that reformed 
later observed the reforms in other kibbutzim, and anticipated that at some later date their kibbutz 
would reform too. However, three relevant things are worth noting. First, conceptually, any 
anticipation effects that were present make it more difficult for us to find an impact of the reform. 
Second, our choice of kibbutzim that reformed at least four years after the treatment kibbutzim 
reformed as our control group makes such anticipation effects less likely and less prominent if 
                                                 
9 Note students are included in the sample based on their location at the start of 10th grade, so students who 
exit a kibbutz during high school are included, whereas those who enter are not. 
10 A similar analysis of entry and exit rates for the 1997-98 cohorts yields comparable results, which are 
available from the authors. 
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they exist. Third, empirically, we do not find evidence of anticipation effects, in the sense that 
educational outcomes in control kibbutzim are similar for the earlier and later cohorts.11
 
 
IV. The Effect of the Reform on High School Educational Outcomes  
a. Basic results: This section shows the basic results without taking the intensity of the reforms 
into account. Panel A, first row, of Table 3 reports simple DID estimates with no additional 
controls (equation 1) and in the second row we present the DID estimates which are based on 
regressions that also include individual characteristics and kibbutz fixed effects (equation 2). 
Each cell in the table shows the estimated coefficient on the post cohort in treated kibbutzim. We 
find a positive coefficient of interest for all schooling outcomes. Two things are worth noting 
before we discuss the results further. First, the simple and controlled DID estimates of this 
treatment effect are similar, which is a result of the similarity between treatment and control 
groups in observables characteristics and in pre-reform outcomes. Second, the estimated 
coefficient on one of the four outcomes is not statistically significant and another one is only 
marginally significant. We later show that this lack of significance in the average effect is driven 
by the heterogeneities of the effects.  
Turning to the estimated treatment effect on the other outcomes, the mean exam score is 
up by 3.55 points relative a pre-treatment mean of 70.6, or 0.17 standard deviations of the test 
score distribution. The matriculation rate is up by 4.9 percentage points and the university 
qualified Bagrut rate is up by 6 percentage points, which amounts to almost 12 percent of the pre-
reform university qualified Bagrut rate in the control group. The improvement in the university 
qualified Bagrut rate could be driven by two particular improvements. The first is an increase in 
the proportion of students who enroll in and pass the English matriculation program at more than 
a basic level. The second is an increase in the proportion of students who pass the matriculation 
program in at least one advanced placement subject. These two criteria are an admission 
requirement for all universities and most colleges in Israel. The improvement we observe likely 
reflects a higher intention to enroll in post-secondary schooling. Finally, it is worth noting that in 
Online Appendix A16 we present the cross section regressions for the pre and post reform period, 
which show that most of the difference-in-difference estimates reflect post treatment differences 
in favor of the treatment group. 
We also explore an alternative dependent variable that combines the information of three 
of our outcomes, an index variable that is 0 for high school dropouts, 1 for high school 
                                                 
11 Students whose kibbutzim reformed a year after they left high school are also similar to students whose 
kibbutzim reformed only later (see Appendix Table A22). 
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graduation, 2 for matriculation certification, and 3 for university-qualified matriculation. 
Imposing cardinality, we estimate an OLS regression with this outcome index as the dependent 
variable. The estimated difference-in-differences effects on this index are presented in column 5 
of Table 3. The controlled difference-in-differences estimate is 0.141 (sd=0.071).  
We also use a probit specification instead of the linear probability models to estimate 
equation (2). These estimates are presented in Table 3 (Panel A, forth row). The implied 
respective estimated marginal effects are  similar to those reported in the second row of this table.   
 In Panel B of Table 3, we present a placebo control experiment. We contrast the 
outcomes of two pre- reform cohorts, the 10th graders in 1995-1996 and the 10th graders in 1997-
1998. These placebo estimated DID are very different from the treatment estimates presented in 
Panel A of Table 3, and they are very close to zero. For example, the placebo estimate of the 
effect on average Bagrut score is 0.304 (s.e. 1.544) and the estimates on the two Bagrut diploma 
outcomes are actually negative, though not significantly different from zero. We also conduct a 
placebo test contrasting the outcomes of the 10th graders in 1995 against the 10th graders in 1996 
and find similar results, i.e. no effect. 
b. Controlling for other reforms: One potential concern is that the pay reforms affected 
schooling outcomes by changing social incentives more broadly. In fact, the 1990s saw a number 
of other reforms in kibbutzim that are likely to have changed social incentives to invest in 
schooling without changing the financial returns to education. If our estimates of the effects of the 
pay reform are insensitive to the inclusion of controls for these social reforms, and the estimated 
effects of these reforms are small, this will suggest the social incentives channel is unlikely to be 
a major driver of our estimated effect of the pay reform. We collected information on the precise 
years in which four relevant reforms were implemented: the introduction of user fees for (1) 
meals in the common dining room, (2) electricity at home, (3) personal laundry, and (4) private 
health insurance. Controlling for these social reforms does not alter the estimated effect of the pay 
reform. These results are presented in the third row in panel A of Table 3. We also note that none 
of the estimated effect of these four other social reforms is significant (see estimates in online 
appendix Table A17).12
c. Allowing for differential effect by “intensity” of reform: The pay reform was not identical 
across kibbutzim. Specifically, some kibbutzim introduced a full pay reform, moving to a “safety 
net” model that reflected market forces. Other kibbutzim introduced only a partial pay reform, 
 
                                                 
12 In Online Appendix Table A17b we present the cross section regressions that include controls for the 
four social reforms and that correspond to the above diff-in-diff estimates. Again one can see that these 




moving to a “combined” model (meshulav) that was still based on market forces, but combined 
them with a more progressive tax and wider safety net for members.13 In this section we take 
advantage of the variation over time in the degree of pay reform, which is present because some 
kibbutzim changed immediately from an equal sharing system to a full differential pay system, 
while others introduced a partial differential pay system initially, but later changed to a complete 
differential pay structure. We can exploit these changes to define treatment intensity because 
some of these kibbutzim made the second change within the period of treatment.14 We therefore 
measure intensity of the pay reform by counting the number of years each student’s kibbutz 
operated under a system of full differential pay while he was of high school age. We define four 
treatment groups, ranging from 3 years of full reform to 0 years of full reform (3 years of partial 
reform).15
The results presented in panel B are very similar to the results in panel A, and they 
highlight the difference in estimated treatment effect of three years of full differential pay versus 
 The group with zero intensity of full pay has the lowest estimated effects, while the 
highest estimated effects are for the group with the highest intensity of treatment. These results 
are presented in Table 4, columns 1-4. The first panel presents the estimates with four intensity 
levels used as treatment measures. In panel B we use only two treatment groups, students exposed 
throughout high school (three years) to a partial pay reform versus students exposed to a full 
differential pay reform throughout their high school. Therefore panel B is based on a sample that 
excludes the two other treatment groups. The estimated effects of the lowest level of reform 
intensity on all four outcomes are very small and not significantly different from zero. On the 
other hand, the effect of being under a full differential pay system for 2 or 3 years has large and 
significant effect on all four outcomes. For example, three years in high school under a full 
differential pay system causes an 8.2 percentage point increase in the matriculation rate and a 
10.0 percentage point increase in the university qualified matriculation rate. In columns 6-9 we 
present treatment intensity effect from a specification that also includes controls for the other four 
social reforms. These estimates have the same pattern as in columns 1-4 with the largest effect for 
exposure to three years of full pay reform.    
                                                 
13 We could not obtain information on kibbutz tax schemes so cannot quantify the partial and full pay 
reform. 
14 Specifically, of the 37 kibbutzim that reformed in 1998, 17 introduced a full pay reform and 20 a partial 
reform, and of the latter group only 6 changed to a full reform within the treatment period (before 2003). Of 
the 14 kibbutzim that reformed in 1999, 7 introduced a full pay reform and 7 a partial reform; of the latter 
group 6 kibbutzim changed to full reform by 2002. Of the 22 kibbutzim that reformed in 2000, 13 
introduced a full pay reform and 9 a partial reform; of the latter group 4 kibbutzim changed to full reform 
by 2002.   
15 We perform balancing tests similar to those presented in Table 3, and the results suggest that the students 
in these four treatment groups are statistically indistinguishable from the students of the control group in 
their observed characteristics. 
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three years of partial differential pay. Overall, the evidence reported in Table 4 suggests the 
magnitude of the treatment effect increases with years of exposure to a system of full differential 
pay. Especially important is the much larger estimated effect of three years of exposure relative to 
the effect of only one year of exposure, because it is based on a comparison of the same type of 
treatment but with different duration.    
We also explore an alternative specification that exploits information on students in all 
kibbutzim that reformed between 1998 and 2004, and assign separate treatment dummy indicators 
for students in cohorts that spent 1, 2, and 3 years of their high school in a reformed kibbutz. We 
then regress the outcome variable on these three indicators of length of exposure to treatment, a 
full set of year of reform dummies, a full set of cohort dummies, controls for the other four social 
reforms and all other student’s control variables. Like the difference-in-differences specification, 
the treatment variable is identified by (reform year)*cohort interactions, but now exploits all 
possible variation. The results of this estimation are presented in Online Appendix Table A18 and 
the estimates are similar to our benchmark difference-in-differences specification and sample, 
which are reported in Table 4, columns 6-9. 
d. Allowing for heterogeneous effects: Heterogeneous effect by social background: First, we 
look at whether the pay reform, full or partial, affected students with different social backgrounds 
differently. On the one hand, assuming utility is concave in income, we expect students from 
lower social classes, who will face a decrease in parental income and are expected to have lower 
personal income on average, to be more affected by the decrease in the income tax because a 
future dollar increase in earnings is more valuable for them. Moreover, we expect students from 
lower social backgrounds to be more affected by the change in return if they are less likely to 
have inherent motivation to invest in schooling and will only do so when given external 
incentives. On the other hand, students whose parents are more educated might receive more help 
at home or elsewhere, because their parents are more able to help them or pay someone to do so, 
and thus be in a better position to improve their schooling when given the incentives. We stratify 
by parental schooling, splitting the sample into two groups as follows: students whose mothers 
have 13 or more years of schooling (50% percent of students) and other students. Alternatively, 
we stratify by the father’s years of schooling and find similar results.16
The heterogeneous estimates by parental schooling presented in Panel A of Table 3 
suggest that the total effect on educational outcomes is largely driven by students who have less 
  
                                                 
16 We also ran balancing tests like those reported in Table 3 for these sub-samples. The results suggest that 
the treated and the respective control group have very similar characteristics, regardless of whether we 
stratify the sample by father’s or by mother’s schooling.  
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educated parents (although the differences are not statistically significant). That is, these 
estimated treatment effects for these students appear larger than the basic controlled difference-
in-differences results presented in Table 3, and their percentage increases are also larger because 
their counterfactual means are much lower than the mean of the overall sample.  
Next, we allow for heterogeneity of the effect by parental education and intensity of 
reform simultaneously. Consistent with the evidence presented in this section and the previous 
one, Online Appendix Table A19 suggests that the total effect on educational outcomes seems to 
be largely driven by students who were exposed to a full differential pay system throughout their 
high schools and whose parents have lower levels of education. These results by parents’ 
education level are the opposite of Jensen’s (2010). We note that the less educated parents in the 
kibbutz are on average more educated than the more educated parents in the Dominican Republic, 
meaning that financial constraints are likely to be less important in our context. We again note 
that this finding that students whose parents are less educated respond more rules out a possible 
income effect whereby we would expect more educated people who gained from the reform to 
respond more because they could invest more in their children’s education. However, less 
educated parents experienced a decline in their income following the pay reform. This change 
may have triggered children, potentially with encouragement from their parents, to invest more in 
schooling in order to offset the lower wellbeing associated with lower relative income at 
adulthood, as suggested by Luttmer (2005). 
Our result that children from low educated families respond more strongly to the 
reduction in the income tax rate could reflect a higher rate of return to schooling perceived by this 
group. A growing body of evidence suggests that indeed the rate of return to schooling is higher 
among individuals who are more credit constrained, have greater immediate need to work, or 
have greater distaste for school (Card, 1995 and 2001). Brenner and Rubinstein (2011) show 
evidence of higher returns to schooling for individuals in poor families in the US. 
Next we allow for heterogeneity by gender. Male and female students have been shown 
to respond differently to incentives (e.g. Schultz 2004, Angrist and Lavy 2009), with females 
typically being more responsive. However, our estimates stratified by gender, presented in Panel 
A of Table 3 suggest a stronger effect on males than on females, although the standard errors of 
the estimates are not precise enough to reject no gender differences. For example, the estimated 
effect on high school completion is 0.051 (s.e. 0.026) for males and 0.012 (s.e. 0.020) for 
females, almost significantly different from each other.  
Finally, Online Appendix Table A20 suggests that the treatment effect is not only larger 
for students who were exposed to a full differential pay system throughout their high school 
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years, but it is the largest for boys who were fully exposed. The treatment effect of the full 
differential pay system for boys is a 4.2 percentage point increase (0.8 percentage points for girls) 
in high school completion rates, a 6.0 point increase (2.8 for girls) in mean exam score, a 10 
percentage point increase (3.5 for girls) in the matriculation rate, and a 9.6 percentage point 
increase (4.8 for girls) in the university qualified matriculation rate. 
Our findings that boys are more affected by the pay reform, in particular in the school 
completion outcome, stand in contrast to Schultz (2004), who finds that girls’ school completion 
responded more to the incentives introduced by Progresa in Mexico. Our findings are also 
different from Angrist and Lavy (2009), who find that girls’ Bagrut diploma attainment is 
affected by conditional bonus payments, whereas boys do not react to this monetary incentive. In 
these papers, girls respond more to an increase in incentives designed to directly increase 
educational outcomes. In our context, the pay reform does not increase such short run incentives 
to perform better in school. In contrast, the pay reform we study operates through affecting the 
future rewards in the labor market. It is possible that females perceive a lower return to education 
in the labor market, expect to work in lower paying jobs on average, perhaps because they do not 
expect to become the main earner (for example because they plan to play a bigger role in raising 
children). Indeed, in regressions we run using the 1998-2000 Israeli labor force surveys and 
matching occupations to their mean earnings using income surveys, we find that females (both in 
kibbutzim and outside them) are substantially more likely to work in lower paying occupations; 
they sort into occupations and industries that pay around 20% less on average (regression results 
are available from the authors upon request). 
 
V. The Effect of the Reform on Post-High School Educational Outcomes  
This section discusses estimates of the effects of the pay reform in kibbutzim on college 
enrollment and completed years of schooling. In assessing this exercise we should note that, 
unlike high school outcomes, post-secondary schooling could be affected by the pay reform 
through two channels. The first channel operates through the effect of the improved high school 
outcomes and the higher educational aspirations while in high school. The second channel is an 
additional effect where individuals may respond as adults to the higher rate of return to schooling, 
regardless of their attainment in high school. The treatment group is exposed to both effects while 
the control group is exposed only to the second because their kibbutzim reformed after they 
completed high school. In this paper we cannot cleanly distinguish between these two potential 
channels because the effect of an increase at adulthood in the rate of return to schooling on the 
decision to purse higher education could be different for individuals in treated and control 
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kibbutzim. If these two effects are similar then the estimates reported below capture mainly the 
first channel of effect on post-high school education. 
The post high school academic schooling system in Israel includes seven universities 
(one of which confers only graduate and PhD degrees), over 45 colleges that confer academic 
undergraduate degrees (some of these also give master’s degrees), and dozens of teachers’ and 
practical engineering colleges that confer bachelor of education or practical engineering 
degrees.17 All universities and colleges require a Bagrut for enrollment. Most teachers’ and 
practical engineering colleges also require a Bagrut, though some look at specific Bagrut 
components without requiring full certification. For a given field of study, it is typically more 
difficult to be admitted to a university than to a college. The national enrollment rates for the 
cohort of graduating seniors in 1995 (through 2003) was 55.4 percent, of which 27.6 percent were 
enrolled in universities, 8.5 percent in academic colleges, 7 percent in teachers’ colleges, and 7.6 
practical engineering colleges.18
The post-high school outcome variables of interest here are indicators of ever having 
enrolled in a post-high school institution of a type described above, as of the 2010–2011 school 
year, and the number of years of schooling completed in these institutions by this date. We 
measure these two outcomes for our 1995-2000 high school graduating cohorts. The youngest 
cohorts (1999 and 2000) in our sample are 28-29 years old in 2010-2011. Even after accounting 
for compulsory military service
 
19
Our information on postsecondary enrollment comes from administrative records 
provided by Israel’s National Insurance Institute (NII). The NII is responsible for social security 
and mandatory health insurance in Israel; it tracks postsecondary enrollment because students pay 
a lower health insurance tax rate. Postsecondary schools are therefore required to send a list of 
enrolled students to the NII every year. For the purposes of our project, the NII Research and 
, we expect that most students who enrolled in post-high school 
education, including those who continued schooling beyond undergraduate studies, to have 
graduated by the 2010–2011 academic year. We therefore present evidence both for enrollment 
and for completed years of post-high school education. 
                                                 
17 Practical engineering colleges run two- to three-year programs awarding degrees or certificates in fields 
like electronics, computers, and industrial production. Two further years of study in an engineering school 
are required in order to complete a BSc in engineering. A 1991 reform sharply increased the supply of 
postsecondary schooling in Israel by creating publicly funded regional and professional colleges.  
18 These data are from the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, Report on Post Secondary Schooling of High 
School Graduates in 1989–1995 (available at: 
http://www.cbs.gov.il/publications/h_education02/h_education_h.htm). 
19 Boys serve for three years and girls for two (longer if they take a commission). Ultra-orthodox Jews are 
exempt from military service as long as they are enrolled in seminary (Yeshiva); orthodox Jewish girls are 
exempt upon request; Arabs are exempt, though some volunteer. 
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Planning Division constructed an extract containing the 2001–2011 enrollment status and number 
of years of post secondary schooling of students in our study. This file was merged with the other 
information in our sample and we used it for analysis at the protected research lab with restricted 
access at NII headquarters in Jerusalem. 
We coded three indicators for enrollment in post-high school education. The first 
indicator identifies if the person ever enrolled in one of the seven universities (at any time from 
2001–11); the second identifies if she ever enrolled in one of the certified academic colleges; and 
the third identifies if she ever enrolled in a teachers’ or practical engineering college. The overall 
ever enrolled rate in any post secondary schooling in our sample is 69 percent, of which 31 
percentage points is in one of the seven universities, 32 percent is in an academic college, and 2.3 
percentage points is in a teachers’ college.20
We focus on results from our basic sample and specification of the controlled difference-
in-differences presented in Table 3. Specifically, the sample includes students of cohorts 1995, 
1996, 1999 and 2000 from kibbutzim that reformed in 1998-2000 and 2003-2004. These results 
are reported in Table 5, panel A. Overall, the results suggest the reform increased post-high 
school enrollment by 4.3% points, although the coefficient is not statistically significant. 
Interestingly, while the reform did not positively affect (in fact insignificantly negatively 
affected) university enrollment (column 2), it increased academic college enrollment by a 
statistically significant 7% points (column 3), which reflects a 22% increase relative to the 
baseline of the treatment group, and increased teachers’ college and practical engineering 
enrollment by 3% points, an over 100% increase. In columns 5-8 we present the estimated effects 
on completed years of post-high school education by the various categories of higher education. 
The evidence here shows the same pattern as the effects on enrollment: an average increase of 
0.174 years of academic college schooling and a 0.071 increase in years of teachers’ college 
education, though the latter effect is not significantly different from zero, and a negative but 
insignificant effect on university schooling.
 The average number of post-high school years of 
schooling completed until the school year 2010-2011 in our sample is 2.7, of which 1.21 are in 
university schooling, 1.25 are in college education and 0.05 are in teachers’ and practical 
engineering colleges.  
21
                                                 
20 Note very few students ever enroll in more than one type of post-school educational institution. 
 
21 We also estimated the effect of the pay reform on post-high school education within 14 years of being in 
10th grade, namely when most of the treated cohorts reached age 30. The results when we impose this 
restriction in calculating the higher education outcomes are presented in online appendix Table A21 and 
they are similar to those reported in Table 5 in the paper. For example, the effect on academic college 
enrollment is 6.8 percent and on academic colleges’ years of schooling it is 0.168, both estimates similar to 
the respective estimates reported in Table 5.  
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We also estimated the effect of the pay reform on higher education using a specification 
that includes controls for the four other major reforms implemented in the kibbutzim since the 
early 1990’s. These estimates follow the same pattern of the evidence presented in panel A, 
though the estimated effect on academic college outcomes is marginally higher and the estimated 
effect on teachers’ colleges is marginally lower and less precisely measured.22
There are several possible reasons for why the reform increased enrollment in colleges 
but not in universities. First, we showed that the effect on high school outcomes was largely 
driven by the subgroup of students whose parents were less educated, and such students are more 
likely to enroll in colleges, where admission requirements tend to be less strict than universities.
 
23
                                                 
22 We also estimated these models by including in the sample the cohorts of 1997 and 1998 and the results 
are very similar to those reported in Table 5. We also estimated the models of the effect of measures of 
reform intensity on post high school schooling outcomes and the results suggest as well a positive effect on 
college education. However, the distinction between and interpretation of the estimated effects by intensity 
of treatment are less clear in this case because it has been more than a decade since the end of high school, 
and some time since even the control kibbutzim reformed.  
 
Second, the number of academic colleges expanded dramatically since the mid 1990’s, making 
them more accessible and less costly than university education, since these colleges are located in 
all regions of the country. The proximity of many kibbutzim to these new colleges made it 
possible for kibbutz members to enroll in higher education without having to move to a big city, 
where the universities are located. Third, the decline in university enrollment may reflect a shift 
in preferences of kibbutz students among different tracks of higher education following the pay 
reform. For example, kibbutz members may now find university education, especially in the 
humanities and social sciences, to be less attractive and less ‘practical’ in terms of financial 
rewards in the “new” kibbutz in comparison with law, economics, and business education, which 
are now available in almost all the academic colleges. Such a shift in preferences may have been 
more relevant to women, who tended to enroll in larger proportions in humanities at universities, 
and now may be shifting to more financially rewarding subjects. Consistent with this idea, in 
panels B and C of Table 5 we present the estimates obtained from separate samples of boys and 
girls. These panels suggest that the reform induced a shift of girls away from university 
enrollment and towards colleges. Regrettably, our data do not allow a more rigorous examination 
of this conjecture. However, we note that the net effect on girls is close to zero, consistent with 
our findings in the previous section of no effect of the pay reform on girls’ high school outcomes. 
In the sample of boys on the other hand the effect is positive both on university and academic 
23 We also estimated the effect of the pay reform separately for students of low and high parental education. 
The results obtained from the sample of students with low parental schooling indicate mainly an increase in 
enrollment and years of schooling in academic teachers’ colleges. This is not surprising because the 
enrollment of students from low education families at universities was lower before the reform started 
because universities typically have higher admission requirements. 
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college enrollment though only the later is significant. The effect on boys’ academic college years 
of schooling is quite large, over a quarter of a year of schooling, which is about a 28 percent 
increase. 
 
VI. Conclusions and Implications   
In this paper we use a natural experiment to estimate the responsiveness of investment in 
education to changes in redistributive policy that change the returns to education. This is, to the 
best of our knowledge, one of the first studies24
The pay reform increased the returns to schooling, which encouraged students to invest 
more in education. However, the pay reform could have influenced schooling outcomes through 
two other channels. First, via the reduction in social incentives for encouraging education that had 
been used under equal sharing (pre reform). Second, via the changes in income levels of parents, 
which might affect education decisions through liquidity constraints, because children’s 
education is a normal good, or through the concavity of utility in income assuming some 
intergenerational transfers. Our paper cannot fully disentangle these mechanisms, but our findings 
provide suggestive evidence that the returns to education channel operated above and beyond the 
social incentives channels, and that the income channel played only limited role. Specifically, 
when we control for other reforms in the kibbutzim that arguably changed social incentives 
without altering the returns to education, the effect of the pay reform is largely unaffected. 
Moreover, if liquidity constraints or the normality of children’s education were important, then 
we would expect students whose parents experienced declines in their income (less educated 
parents) to reduce investment in schooling. Instead, we find the improvement in schooling 
outcomes is largely driven by students whose parents have low education. Parental income effects 
 that use non-experimental data with an actual 
change in the rate of return to schooling to study the impact of an increase in the benefit from 
schooling on human capital investment. We find students are indeed responsive to changes in the 
redistributive policies: when their kibbutzim reformed, they considerably improved their 
educational outcomes such as whether they graduated and their average matriculation exam 
scores. Students who spent their entire three years of high school in a kibbutz that reformed to a 
greater extent improved their educational outcomes more. Males seem to have reacted more 
strongly than females, and students with less educated parents appear to have reacted more 
strongly than those with more educated parents, although these differences between subgroups 
are not statistically significant. 
                                                 
24 Foster and Rosenzweig (1996) shows that the green revolution in India increased returns to primary 
schooling and resulted in increases in private investments in schooling. 
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that operate through the concavity of utility also seem unlikely the main drivers of the results 
because they should be small on average within a kibbutz as some parents face income increases 
and others decreases, yet the overall effect of the reform is positive on average (even if not 
always statistically significant). 
We further show that for many students the increase in high school outcomes translated 
into increased post-high school education, especially in terms of enrollment in academic and 
teachers’ colleges. The sharpest rise is in enrollment in academic colleges, a 7 percentage point 
increase with an increase in completed years of schooling of almost 0.2. These increases seem 
likely to have generated substantial economic gains, since evidence suggests the returns to post-
high school education in Israel are high.25
While an important advantage of our setting is the high internal validity of the estimates, 
we believe that our findings also have implications beyond the Israeli context. First, they shed 
light on the educational responses that could result from a decrease in the income tax rate, thus 
are informative on the long-run labor supply responses to tax changes. Second, they shed light on 
the educational responses expected when the returns to education increase. For example, such 




Our findings also contribute to the literature on the increase in earnings inequality in the 
US and many other developed countries over the past decades, which perhaps is one of the most 
important aggregate phenomena in labor markets since WWII (known as “Skill Biased 
Technological Change”). A large body of research focuses on the implications of technological 
advancement for the demand for skill (see Katz and Autor, 1999 and recent updates of this 
survey), yet no attention is given to estimating the impact of the returns to education on the 
 While the pay reform in kibbutzim is likely larger than many other policy changes 
aiming to reduce the income tax rates or increase the rates of return to education, the kibbutz 
serves as a microcosm for learning about other important episodes with similarly large reforms. 
Examples of such episodes include the transitions of central and eastern European countries from 
centrally planned to market economies after the fall of the Iron Curtain, the abolition of village 
collectives in China in the 1980s, and Vietnam’s labor market liberalization in the mid 1980s.  
                                                 
25 For example, Frisch and Moalem (1999) estimate the return to a year of college to be about 11 percent in 
the late 1990s, while Frisch (2007) estimates the average return to having any post-high school education to 
be about 34 percent. Since the average rate of return to schooling in kibbutzim appears to be similar to the 
national average rate of return, we expect that the payoff to higher education in kibbutzim will be similar to 
the national rate. Of course, the economic returns to schooling for affected students in our study may differ 
from 11 percent. For example, Card (1995) argues that the returns to schooling for credit-constrained 
students should be higher than population average returns.   
26 See, for example, the discussion in Autor, Katz and Krueger (1999), Card and Dinardo (2002), and 
Golding and Katz (2008). 
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supply of educated workers. This is a key factor for understanding the longer-run consequences 
of changes in the demand structure in the era of “Skill Biased Technological Change”. To the best 
of our knowledge, this paper is the first to tackle this question. Estimating the supply elasticity 
requires an external source of variation in the returns to education, solely driven by demand 
factors, and independent of preexisting stocks and current flows of skilled labor. This might 
explain the lack of credible empirical research on this front. The experience of the Israeli 
economy during the 1980s-1990s in general, and the kibbutzim communities in particular, 
provides a unique setting for estimating the causal impact of the returns to education on school 
choices and the supply of educated workers. 
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 Table 1: Balancing Tests of Students' Characteristics and Outcomes in Treatment and Control Kibbutzim  
  
10th Grade Students 
 
10th Grade Students  
  
 in 1995 and 1996 
 
in 1999 and 2000 
  
Treatment Control Difference 
 
Treatment Control Difference 
    (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
         A. Student's Characteristics 
       
         
 
Male 0.495 0.507 -0.013 
 
0.523 0.536 -0.012 
 
 
(0.500) (0.500) (0.027) 
 
(0.500) (0.499) (0.023) 
         
 
Father's Years of Schooling 13.26  13.59  -0.328 
 
13.60  14.12  -0.523 
 
 
(2.776) (2.841) (0.264) 
 
(2.525) (2.973) (0.419) 
         
 
Mother's Years of Schooling 13.42  13.71  -0.292 
 
13.94  14.08  -0.140 
 
 
(2.47)  (2.44)  (0.174) 
 
(2.23)  (2.25)  (0.229) 
         
 
Number of Siblings 2.56  2.65  -0.094 
 
2.53  2.77  -0.239 
 
 
(1.357) (1.358) (0.199) 
 
(1.249) (1.581) (0.280) 
         
 
Ethnic Origin: Africa/Asia 0.105 0.103 0.001 
 
0.091 0.079 0.012 
 
 
(0.306) (0.304) (0.016) 
 
(0.288) (0.270) (0.021) 
         
 
Ethnic Origin: Europe/America 0.346 0.379 -0.033 
 
0.360 0.306 0.054 
 
 
(0.476) (0.486) (0.035) 
 
(0.480) (0.461) (0.033) 
         
 
Immigrants from Non-FSU 
Countries 0.016 0.015 0.001 
 
0.013 0.013 0.000 
 
 
(0.127) (0.122) (0.006) 
 
(0.115) (0.114) (0.006) 
         
 
Immigrants from FSU Countries 0.013 0.017 -0.004 
 
0.031 0.023 0.008 
 
 
(0.112) (0.128) (0.007) 
 
(0.173) (0.150) (0.009) 
 
 
       
 
 
       B. High School Outcomes 
       
         
 
High School Completion 0.951 0.967 -0.016 
 
- - - 
 
 
(0.216) (0.180) (0.011) 
    
         
 
Mean Matriculation Score 70.62 72.48 -1.862 
 
- - - 
 
 
(23.250) (21.039) (1.309) 
    
         
 
Matriculation Certification 0.549 0.569 -0.020 
 
- - - 
 
 
(0.498) (0.496) (0.036) 
 
   
         
 
University Qualified Matriculation 0.516 0.536 -0.019 
 
- - - 
 
 
(0.500) (0.499) (0.035) 
    
 
 
       
 
Kibbutzim 74  33  
  
74  33  
 
 
Students 1,100  601  - 
 
1,043  605  - 
 
 
       C. Entry and Exit 
       
         
 
Exit 0.056 0.042 0.015 
 
0.052 0.038 0.014 
 
 
(0.231) (0.200) (0.016) 
 
(0.222) (0.191) (0.011) 
 
Entry 0.030 0.043 -0.013 
 
0.026 0.022 0.004 
 
 
(0.170) (0.202) (0.016) 
 
(0.158) (0.147) (0.010) 
                 
Notes: Columns 1, 2, 4 and 5 present means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of characteristics and outcomes 
of students in treatment and control kibbutzim for affected (1999-2000) and unaffected (1995-1996) cohorts of 10th 
graders.  Columns 3 and 6 present the differences between treatment and control kibbutzim from a regression of 
each characteristics on a treatment indicator. Standard errors of these differences clustered at the kibbutz level are 
given in parentheses. Treatment kibbutzim are those that reformed in 1998-2000. Control kibbutzim are those that 





Table 2: Treatment-Control Differences in Pre-Reform Time Trends in Schooling Outcomes, 10th Grade 




Mean Matriculation Score 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
      A. Linear Trend Model 
     






















      B. Cohort Dummies Model 
     















































F(  5,   593) =    
0.58 
F(  5,   488) =    
0.66  
F(  5,   593) =    
0.50 
F(  5,   488) =    
0.48 
  
Prob > F =    
0.7125 
Prob > F =    
0.6516   
Prob > F =    
0.7773 
Prob > F =    
0.7897 
Notes: This table presents the results from OLS regressions run at the kibbutz level predicting the proportion of 
students who received matriculation certificates (columns 1 and 2) or the mean scores in the matriculation exams 
(columns 3 and 4) for the cohorts of 10th graders from 1993 to 1998 (pre reform). In the regressions in Panel A, 
outcomes are allowed to vary according to a linear time (cohort) trend that differs in treatment and control 
kibbutzim. In the regressions in Panel B, the difference between treatment and control kibbutzim is allowed to vary 
freely for each cohort of students. Cohort dummies are included in the Panel B regressions but their coefficients are 
not reported. Estimates in columns 2 and 4 include kibbutz fixed effects.  Standard errors are presented in 
parentheses. The number of observations in each regression is 766. The F statistics at the bottom of the table test 
whether all the interaction terms in Panel B between treatment kibbutzim and the cohorts are jointly zero.  















    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
       A. Experiment of Interest, 10th Grade Students in 1995-1996 and 1999-2000 
  
       Difference-in-Differences Regressions 
     
       
 
Simple Difference-in-Differences 0.033 3.112 0.029 0.040 0.101 
  
(0.016) (1.517) (0.035) (0.035) (0.075) 
  
(0.016) (1.517) (0.035) (0.035) (0.072) 
       
 
Controlled Difference-in-Differences 0.033 3.546 0.049 0.060 0.141 
  
(0.015) (1.604) (0.035) (0.035) (0.073) 
  
(0.017) (1.605) (0.035) (0.036) (0.071) 
       
 
Difference-in-Differences also 
Controlling for Other Social Reforms 
0.048 4.501 0.076 0.082 .206 
 
(0.020) (1.985) (0.042) (0.043) (0.087) 
       
 
Probit Controlled Difference-in-
Differences, Marginal Effects 
0.402 - 0.142 0.168 - 
 
(0.192) - (0.099) (0.102) - 
       Sample Stratification by Mother's Education 
    
       
 
Low 0.049 6.175 0.116 0.100 .265 
  
(0.028) (2.556) (0.053) (0.052) (0.110) 
       
 
High 0.014 0.329 -0.031 0.002 -0.015 
  
(0.019) (2.050) (0.046) (0.046) (0.092) 













       Sample Stratification by Gender 
     
       
 
Male 0.051 4.652 0.057 0.051 0.166 
  
(0.026) (2.701) (0.053) (0.051) (0.111) 
       
 
Female 0.012 2.685 0.026 0.033 0.068 
  
(0.020) (2.153) (0.048) (0.051) (0.103) 













       
B. Control Experiment, 10th Grade Students in 1995-1996 and 1997-1998  
  
       Difference-in-Differences Regressions 
     
       
 
Simple Difference-in-Differences 0.011 0.213 -0.016 -0.025 -0.030 
  
(0.015) (1.527) (0.036) (0.036) (0.076) 
       
 
Controlled Difference-in-Differences 0.011 0.304 -0.013 -0.027 -0.030 
  
(0.016) (1.600) (0.035) (0.036) (0.076) 
       
Notes: Treatment kibbutzim are those that reformed in 1998-2000; control kibbutzim are those that reformed in 2003-
04.  The dependent variable in column 1 is whether the student completed high school; in column 2 it is her mean 
score in the matriculation exams; in column 3 it is whether she received a matriculation certificate; in column 4 it is 
whether she received a matriculation certificate that satisfies the requirements for university study; in column 5 the 
outcome index receives the following values: 0 if the student drops out of school, 1 if the student graduates without 
receiving bagrut, 2 if the student receives a bagrut, and 3 if the student receives a bagrut that is university qualified. 
Panel A presents the coefficients of interest in difference-in-differences regressions comparing students in treatment 
and control kibbutzim who are treated (10th grade in 1999-2000) and untreated (10th grade in 1995-96). The simple 
difference-in-differences regressions include cohort dummies. The controlled difference-in-differences estimation 
(equation (2) in the text) includes cohort dummies, kibbutz fixed effects, and the demographic controls gender, 
father's and mother's education, number of siblings, and a set of ethnic dummies (origin from Africa/Asia, 
Europe/America, immigrants from FSU, Ethiopia and other countries). Row 3 presents the coefficients of interest in 
difference-in-differences regressions that also control for other four social reforms. Row 4 presents the marginal 
effects of a Probit version of the controlled difference-in-differences regressions. Panel B presents difference-in-
differences regressions parallel to the first two rows of Panel A, but that compare two untreated cohorts. Robust and 
clustered standard errors are presented in parentheses respectively. 
 
 Table 4: Controlled Difference in Differences Estimates by Intensity of Exposure to Full or Partial Pay Reform 
  




























    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)   (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
             A. Intensity of Exposure 
           
             
 
Three Years of Full Reform 0.029 4.288 0.082 0.100 0.212 
 
0.056 5.984 0.147 0.146 0.348 
 
(N=405) (0.019) (2.055) (0.043) (0.043) (0.091) 
 
(0.022) (2.490) (0.051) (0.052) (0.108) 
  
(0.022) (2.105) (0.049) (0.049) (0.101) 
 
(0.026) (2.748) (0.058) (0.057) (0.117) 
             
 
Two Years of Full Reform 0.054 5.621 0.031 0.083 0.167 
 
0.067 6.548 0.058 0.105 0.230 
 
(N=211) (0.018) (1.925) (0.047) (0.047) (0.098) 
 
(0.019) (2.038) (0.050) (0.050) (0.103) 
  
(0.019) (2.098) (0.049) (0.053) (0.108) 
 
(0.021) (2.310) (0.053) (0.055) (0.116) 
             
 
One Year of Full Reform 0.053 3.744 0.009 -0.020 0.042 
 
0.067 4.766 0.035 0.004 0.106 
 
(N=114) (0.024) (2.485) (0.058) (0.059) (0.120) 
 
(0.025) (2.620) (0.061) (0.061) (0.126) 
  
(0.020) (2.479) (0.054) (0.048) (0.100) 
 
(0.023) (2.652) (0.055) (0.054) (0.108) 
             
 
Up to Three Years of Partial Reform 0.016 1.239 0.036 0.025 0.077 
 
0.025 2.130 0.060 0.049 0.134 
 
(N=313) (0.020) (2.202) (0.045) (0.045) (0.096) 
 
(0.022) (2.355) (0.047) (0.048) (0.100) 
  
(0.023) (2.259) (0.048) (0.051) (0.099) 
 
(0.025) (2.474) (0.051) (0.054) (0.106) 
             
 
F-statistic 2.379 2.065 0.801 1.539 1.298 
 
3.084 2.239 1.723 2.369 2.383 
 
P-value 0.056 0.091 0.527 0.196 0.276 
 
0.019 0.070 0.150 0.057 0.056 
             B. Intensity of Exposure: partial versus full 
          
             
 
Three Years of Full Reform 0.030 4.431 0.084 0.103 0.216 
 
0.062 5.882 0.188 0.189 0.440 
 
(N=405) (0.019) (2.064) (0.043) (0.043) (0.092) 
 
(0.024) (2.718) (0.054) (0.056) (0.114) 
  
(0.022) (2.120) (0.049) (0.050) (0.102) 
 
(0.029) (3.158) (0.063) (0.061) (0.124) 
             
 
Three Years of Partial Reform 0.015 1.285 0.035 0.026 0.077 
 
0.024 2.039 0.076 0.063 0.163 
 
(N=313) (0.021) (2.219) (0.046) (0.046) (0.096) 
 
(0.022) (2.450) (0.048) (0.049) (0.102) 
  
(0.023) (2.286) (0.048) (0.051) (0.100) 
 
(0.027) (2.601) (0.053) (0.055) (0.109) 
             
 
F-statistic 0.943 2.185 1.505 2.141 2.301 
 
2.292 1.734 4.540 4.900 6.298 
 
P-value 0.393 0.118 0.227 0.123 0.105 
 
0.106 0.181 0.013 0.009 0.003 
             Notes: This table presents the results of difference-in-differences regressions comparing students in treatment (reformed 1998-2000) and control (reformed 2003-04) kibbutzim who are treated (10th grade in 1999-2000) and 
untreated (10th grade in 1995-96), where the treatment effect varies by the number of years the student spent in high school under a full relative to partial differential pay system. The value of N for each intensity of 
treatment is the number of students who faced that intensity of treatment.  Panel A presents results from regressions that allow the effect of the reform to differ by number of years under a full pay reform, or whether the 
student faced a partial pay reform. The Outcome Index receives the following values: 0 if the student drops out of school, 1 if the student graduates without receiving bagrut, 2 if the student receives a bagrut, and 3 if the 
student receives a bagrut that is university qualified. Panel B regressions duplicate panel A regressions, but omit students who experienced a change in pay system while at high school. In each case, estimation includes 
cohort dummies, kibbutz fixed effects, and the demographic controls gender, father's and mother's education, number of siblings, and a set of origin dummies (Africa/Asia, Europe/America, immigrants from FSU, Ethiopia 
and other countries).  Robust standard errors and clustered standard errors respectively are presented in parentheses. F-statistic and P-value are reported for the hypothesis that all the coefficients on treatment intensity are 
jointly zero.        
  
 
Table 5: The Effect of the Pay Reform on Post Secondary Schooling  
  
Enrollment in Post High School Education 
 



















    (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8) 
A. Full Sample 
         
           
 
Controlled DID 0.043 -0.031 0.070 0.030 
 
0.054 -0.152 0.174 0.071 
  
(0.034) (0.033) (0.036) (0.016) 
 
(0.151) (0.135) (0.113) (0.045) 
  
(0.036) (0.030) (0.038) (0.014) 
 
(0.167) (0.137) (0.119) (0.039) 
 
Mean (Cohorts: 1995-1996) 0.69 0.31 0.32 0.02 
 
2.72 1.21 1.25 0.106 
B. Boys          
           
 
Controlled DID 0.068 0.031 0.080 0.032 
 
0.260 -0.034 0.267 0.057 
  
(0.051) (0.047) (0.049) (0.021) 
 
(0.211) (0.183) (0.145) (0.056) 
  
(0.053) (0.046) (0.049) (0.021) 
 
(0.233) (0.186) (0.140) (0.055) 
 
Mean (Cohorts: 1995-1996) 0.63 0.26 0.30 0.02 
 
2.24 1.05 0.94 0.093 
C. Girls          
           
 
Controlled DID 0.030 -0.088 0.081 0.035 
 
-0.052 -0.230 0.162 0.082 
  
(0.047) (0.049) (0.053) (0.024) 
 
(0.221) (0.200) (0.180) (0.071) 
  
(0.048) (0.049) (0.062) (0.021) 
 
(0.244) (0.195) (0.186) (0.060) 
 Mean (Cohorts: 1995-1996) 0.76 0.37 0.35 0.02  3.19 1.37 1.56 0.118 
Notes: This table presents the results of difference-in-differences regressions examining post-high school education outcomes, comparing students in treatment (reformed 1998-
2000) and control (reformed 2003-04) kibbutzim who are treated (10th grade in 1999-2000) and untreated (10th grade in 1995-96). The Panel A regressions present results for the 
full sample, panel B for boys only, and panel C for girls only. The dependent variables in columns 1-4 are dummy variables that receive the value 1 if the student was ever enrolled 
and 0 otherwise; the dependent variables in columns 5-8 are counts of the number of post high school years of schooling obtained by the student. Robust and clustered standard 
errors respectively are presented in parentheses. 
Pre Reform
Mean/Median Wage
all no outliers all all no outliers all no outliers
High school or less 44 37 8,661 7,980        9,331        6,929        8,000         
College or other post-secondary 36 31 8,661 8,592        9,853        7,695        9,000         
MA 20 19 8,661 10,060      10,536      9,750        10,500       
PhD 2 2 8,661 10,881      10,881      10,881      10,881       
Notes : Wages are measured in New Israeli 2010 Shekels per month. 1 US dollar is currently equal to approximately 3.6 shekels. Outliers are members with wages
below 2000 shekels. We exclude them because we suspect they only work part time.
Table A1 : Wage by Education of All Working Members in One Particular Kibbutz Pre and Post Reform
Post Reform
Number of Observations Mean Wage Median Wage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Years of Schooling .080 .083
(.021) (.021)






Age and Age Squared No Yes No Yes
Kibbutz Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 197 196 197 196
Table A2 : Post Reform Wage by Education of All Working Members in Two Kibbutzim
Notes : This tables presents results from OLS regressions where the dependent variable is the natural
log of wages, run for members of two reformed kibbutzim. Wages are measured in New Israeli 2010
Shekels per month. 1 US dollar is currently equal to approximately 3.6 shekels. Outliers are members
with wages below 2000 shekels. We exclude them because we suspect they only work part time.Years
of schooling are calculated as 8 for elementary, 12 for high school, 14 for other post-secondary, 15 for 







A. 10th Grade Students in 1995-1996
Kibbutzim 74 47 33
Students 1,100 826 601
B. 10th Grade Students in 1999-2000
Kibbutzim 74 47 33
Students 1,043 753 605
Table A3 : Distribution of Kibbutzim, Schools and Students by Year of Reform and by 
10th Grade Cohorts
Year of Reform
Notes : This table presents the number of kibbutzim and students in the treatment and control
kibutzim and treated (10th grade in 1999-2000) and untreated (10th grade in 1995-96) cohorts.
Dependent variable: Treatment kibbutz
Student's Characteristics
Male
Father's Years of Schooling




Immigrants from Non-FSU Countries




Notes : The dependent variable is a dummy variable for treatment kibbutzim (reformed 1998-2000). Control kibbutzim 
are those that reformed in 2003-04. The explanatory variables are the background characteristics of students. Cohort 
fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clustered at the kibbutz level and are given in parentheses. The F-statistic 














-0.0114 -0.0264 -0.0182 
(0.0066) (0.0098) (0.0075)
-0.0078 0.0046 -0.0022 
(0.0246) (0.0204) (0.0156)
-0.0058 -0.0163 -0.0110 
(1) (2) (3)
-0.0135 -0.0044 -0.0118
Table A4 : Balancing Test of Students' Characteristics in Treatment and Control Kibbutzim                           
Controlling for all background characteristics in one regression
10th Grade Students 10th Grade Students 10th Grade Students 
 in 1995 and 1996 in 1999 and 2000 Pooled Data
Treatment Control Difference Treatment Control Difference
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Student's Characteristics
Male 0.475 0.507 -0.032 0.528 0.536 -0.008
(0.500) (0.500) (0.033) (0.500) (0.499) (0.031)
Father's Years of Schooling 13.24 13.59 -0.350 13.54 14.12 -0.583
(2.938) (2.841) (0.280) (2.547) (2.973) (0.430)
Mother's Years of Schooling 13.52 13.71 -0.189 14.04 14.08 -0.046
2.34 2.44 (0.217) 2.21 2.25 (0.245)
Number of Siblings 2.60 2.65 -0.046 2.56 2.77 -0.214
(1.409) (1.358) (0.231) (1.332) (1.581) (0.310)
Ethnic Origin: Africa/Asia 0.098 0.103 -0.005 0.081 0.079 0.001
(0.298) (0.304) (0.020) (0.272) (0.270) (0.022)
Ethnic Origin: Europe/America 0.359 0.379 -0.020 0.369 0.306 0.063
(0.480) (0.486) (0.043) (0.483) (0.461) (0.040)
Immigrants from Non-FSU Countries 0.020 0.015 0.005 0.013 0.013 -0.001
(0.140) (0.122) (0.008) (0.112) (0.114) (0.007)
Immigrants from FSU Countries 0.016 0.017 -0.001 0.032 0.023 0.009
(0.124) (0.128) (0.009) (0.176) (0.150) (0.012)
B. High School Outcomes
High School Completion 0.949 0.967 -0.018 - - -
(0.221) (0.180) (0.015)
Mean Matriculation Score 71.40 72.48 -1.075 - - -
(21.876) (21.039) (1.573)
Matriculation Certification 0.576 0.569 0.007 - - -
(0.495) (0.496) (0.045)
University Qualified Matriculation 0.538 0.536 0.002 - - -
(0.499) (0.499) (0.044)
Observations 448 601 472 605
Notes : Columns 1, 2, 4 and 5 present means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of characteristics and outcomes of
students in treatment and control kibbutzim for affected (1999-2000) and unaffected (1995-1996) cohorts of 10th graders.
Columns 3 and 6 present the differences between treatment and control kibbutzim from a regression of each characteristics
on a treatment indicator . Standard errors of these differences clustered at the kibbutz level are given in parentheses.
Treatment kibbutzim are those that reformed fully in 1998-2000. Control kibbutzim are those that reformed in 2003-2004. 
Table A5 : Balancing Tests of Students' Characteristics and Outcomes in Treatment and Control Kibbutzim 
Treatment Kibbutzim : Reformed fully in 1998-2000; Control Kibbutzim : Reformed 2003-04
10th Grade Students 10th Grade Students 
 in 1995 and 1996 in 1999 and 2000
Dependent variable: Treatment kibbutz
Student's Characteristics
Male
Father's Years of Schooling




Immigrants from Non-FSU Countries




Notes :  The dependent variable is a dummy variable for treatment kibbutzim (reformed fully 1998-2000). Control 
kibbutzim are those that reformed in 2003-04. The explanatory variables are the background characteristics of students. 
Cohort fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clustered at the kibbutz level are given in parentheses. The F-


















-0.0097 -0.0214 -0.0152 
(1) (2) (3)
-0.0358 0.0015 -0.0204
Table A6 : Balancing Test of Students' Characteristics in Treatment and Control Kibbutzim
Treatment Kibbutzim : Reformed fully in 1998-2000; Control Kibbutzim : Reformed 2003-04
Controlling for all background characteristics in one regression                           
10th Grade Students 10th Grade Students 10th Grade Students 
 in 1995 and 1996 in 1999 and 2000 Pooled Data
Treatment Control Difference Treatment Control Difference
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Student's Characteristics
Male 0.508 0.507 0.000 0.520 0.536 -0.015
(0.500) (0.500) (0.029) (0.500) (0.499) (0.025)
Father's Years of Schooling 13.28 13.59 -0.313 13.65 14.12 -0.473
(2.662) (2.841) (0.286) (2.508) (2.973) (0.429)
Mother's Years of Schooling 13.35 13.71 -0.363 13.86 14.08 -0.218
2.56 2.44 (0.186) 2.24 2.25 (0.241)
Number of Siblings 2.52 2.65 -0.128 2.51 2.77 -0.259
(1.320) (1.358) (0.220) (1.176) (1.581) (0.289)
Ethnic Origin: Africa/Asia 0.109 0.103 0.006 0.100 0.079 0.020
(0.312) (0.304) (0.018) (0.300) (0.270) (0.025)
Ethnic Origin: Europe/America 0.337 0.379 -0.042 0.352 0.306 0.046
(0.473) (0.486) (0.039) (0.478) (0.461) (0.038)
Immigrants from Non-FSU Countries 0.014 0.015 -0.001 0.014 0.013 0.001
(0.117) (0.122) (0.007) (0.118) (0.114) (0.007)
Immigrants from FSU Countries 0.011 0.017 -0.006 0.030 0.023 0.007
(0.103) (0.128) (0.007) (0.170) (0.150) (0.010)
B. High School Outcomes
High School Completion 0.952 0.967 -0.014 - - -
(0.213) (0.180) (0.013)
Mean Matriculation Score 70.07 72.48 -2.403 - - -
(24.151) (21.039) (1.497)
Matriculation Certification 0.531 0.569 -0.038 - - -
(0.499) (0.496) (0.038)
University Qualified Matriculation 0.502 0.536 -0.034 - - -
(0.500) (0.499) (0.038)
Observations 652 601 571 605
Notes : Columns 1, 2, 4 and 5 present means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of characteristics and outcomes of
students in treatment and control kibbutzim for affected (1999-2000) and unaffected (1995-1996) cohorts of 10th graders.
Columns 3 and 6 present the differences between treatment and control kibbutzim a regression of each characteristics on a
treatment indicator. Standard errors of these differences clustered at the kibbutz level are given in parentheses. Treatment
kibbutzim are those that reformed partially in 1998-2000 (and did not reform fully during the treatment period). Control 
Table A7 : Balancing Tests of Students' Characteristics and Outcomes in Treatment and Control Kibbutzim 
Treatment Kibbutzim : Reformed partially in 1998-2000; Control Kibbutzim : Reformed 2003-04
10th Grade Students 10th Grade Students 
 in 1995 and 1996 in 1999 and 2000
Dependent variable: Treatment kibbutz
Student's Characteristics
Male
Father's Years of Schooling




Immigrants from Non-FSU Countries




Notes :The dependent variable is a dummy variable for treatment kibbutzim (reformed partially 1998-2000). Control 
kibbutzim are those that reformed in 2003-04. The explanatory variables are the background characteristics of students. 
Cohort fixed effects are included. Standard errors clustered at the kibbutz level are given in parentheses.The F-statistic 














-0.0177 -0.0295 -0.0232 
(0.0081) (0.0098) (0.0079)
-0.0118 -0.0010 -0.0069 
(0.0284) (0.0243) (0.0185)
-0.0036 -0.0122 -0.0082 
(1) (2) (3)
-0.0028 -0.0088 -0.0089
Table A8 : Balancing Test of Students' Characteristics in Treatment and Control Kibbutzim                           
Treatment Kibbutzim : Reformed partially in 1998-2000; Control Kibbutzim : Reformed 2003-04
Controlling for all background characteristics in one regression 
10th Grade Students 10th Grade Students 10th Grade Students 











(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Student's Characteristics
Male 0.475 0.508 -0.032 0.528 0.520 0.007
(0.500) (0.500) (0.029) (0.500) (0.500) (0.032)
Father's Years of Schooling 13.24 13.28 -0.037 13.54 13.65 -0.110
(2.938) (2.662) (0.208) (2.547) (2.508) (0.185)
Mother's Years of Schooling 13.52 13.35 0.173 14.04 13.86 0.173
2.34 2.56 (0.200) 2.21 2.24 (0.159)
Number of Siblings 2.60 2.52 0.082 2.56 2.51 0.045
(1.409) (1.320) (0.211) (1.332) (1.176) (0.205)
Ethnic Origin: Africa/Asia 0.098 0.109 -0.011 0.081 0.100 -0.019
(0.298) (0.312) (0.021) (0.272) (0.300) (0.023)
Ethnic Origin: Europe/America 0.359 0.337 0.022 0.369 0.352 0.017
(0.480) (0.473) (0.042) (0.483) (0.478) (0.040)
Immigrants from non-FSU countries 0.020 0.014 0.006 0.013 0.014 -0.001
(0.140) (0.117) (0.008) (0.112) (0.118) (0.007)
Immigrants from FSU countries 0.016 0.011 0.005 0.032 0.030 0.002
(0.124) (0.103) (0.007) (0.176) (0.170) (0.013)
B. High School Outcomes
High School Completion 0.949 0.952 -0.004 - - -
(0.221) (0.213) (0.015)
Mean Matriculation Score 71.40 70.07 1.328 - - -
(21.876) (24.151) (1.622)
Matriculation Certification 0.576 0.531 0.045 - - -
(0.495) (0.499) (0.042)
University Qualified Matriculation 0.538 0.502 0.036 - - -
(0.499) (0.500) (0.042)
Observations 448 652 472 571
Notes : Columns 1, 2, 4 and 5 present means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of characteristics and outcomes of
students in kibbutzim that reformed fully or partially for affected (1999-2000) and unaffected (1995-1996) cohorts of 10th
graders. Columns 3 and 6 present the differences between fully- and partially-reformed kibbutzim a regression of each
characteristics on a treatment indicator. Standard errors of these differences clustered at the kibbutz level are given in
parentheses. Here "fully reformed kibbutzim" refers to kibbutzim that reformed fully in 1998-2000, and "partially reformed 
Table A9 : Balancing Tests of Students' Characteristics and Outcomes in Fully- Versus Partially-Reformed 
Kibbutzim
10th Grade Students 10th Grade Students 
 in 1995 and 1996 in 1999 and 2000
Dependent variable: Fully-reformed kibbutz
Student's Characteristics
Male
Father's Years of Schooling




Immigrants from Non-FSU Countries




Notes : The dependent variable is a dummy variable for kibbutzim that reformed fully in 1998-2000. The comparison 
group is students in kibbutzim that reformed only partially in 1998-2000, and didn't reform fully during the treatment 
period. The explanatory variables are the background characteristics of students. Cohort fixed effects are included. 
Standard errors clustered at the kibbutz level are given in parentheses. The F-statistic and P-value are reported for the 


















-0.0060 -0.0093 -0.0073 
(1) (2) (3)
-0.0326 0.0091 -0.0119
Table A10 : Balancing Tests of Students' Characteristics in Fully- Versus Partially-Reformed Kibbutzim
Controlling for all background characteristics in one regression
10th Grade Students 10th Grade Students 10th Grade Students 
 in 1995 and 1996 in 1999 and 2000 Pooled Data
Dependent variable: Proportion of high school spent in a reformed kibbutz

















Full and Partial 
Reform
Full and Partial 
Reform
Full and Partial 
Reform
(1) (2) (3) (3)
Student's Characteristics
Male 0.010 -0.001 -0.005 -0.003
(-0.030) (-0.009) (-0.007) (0.006)
Father's Years of Schooling -0.010 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004
(-0.011) (-0.004) (-0.004) (0.002)
Mother's Years of Schooling -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 0.000
(0.008) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Number of Siblings -0.011 -0.013 -0.011 -0.003
(-0.034) (-0.012) (-0.011) (0.008)
Ethnic Origin: Africa/Asia -0.021 -0.014 -0.018 0.011
(0.063) (0.024) (0.020) (0.015)
Ethnic Origin: Europe/America 0.059 0.022 0.010 0.006
(-0.043) (-0.014) (-0.013) (0.010)
Immigrants from Non-FSU Countries -0.009 -0.010 -0.004 0.019
(0.146) (0.045) (0.034) (0.028)
Immigrants from FSU Countries 0.056 -0.021 -0.037 -0.027
(-0.132) (-0.043) (-0.037) (0.028)
F-statistic 0.534 0.768 0.848 0.888
P-value 0.829 0.632 0.563 0.528
Observations 3,349 3,349 5,024 7,336
Table A11 : Balancing Test of Characteristics of Students Who Faced Different Intensities of Reform
Notes : The dependent variable measures the intensity of the reform faced by the student during high school: 0 (no 
reform), 1/3 (1 year of reform), 2/3 (2 years of reform), to 1 (3 years of reform). Explanatory variables are the background 
characteristics of the students. Cohort fixed effecst are included. Standard errors clustered at the kibbutz level are given in 
parentheses. The F-statistic and P-value are reported for the hypothesis that all the coefficients on students' characterisitics 
are jointly zero.     
Treatment Control Difference Treatment Control Difference
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Student's Characteristics
Male 0.495 0.541 -0.047 0.523 0.486 0.037
(0.500) (0.499) (0.022) (0.500) (0.500) (0.021)
Father's Years of Schooling 13.26 13.57 -0.308 13.60 13.87 -0.266
(2.776) (2.923) (0.165) (2.525) (2.658) (0.131)
Mother's Years of Schooling 13.42 13.63 -0.209 13.94 14.10 -0.163
2.47 2.54 (0.140) 2.23 2.34 (0.104)
Number of Siblings 2.56 2.93 -0.377 2.53 2.80 -0.263
(1.357) (1.525) (0.184) (1.249) (1.284) (0.140)
Ethnic Origin: Africa/Asia 0.105 0.095 0.009 0.091 0.093 -0.002
(0.306) (0.294) (0.015) (0.288) (0.291) (0.015)
Ethnic Origin: Europe/America 0.346 0.374 -0.027 0.360 0.350 0.010
(0.476) (0.484) (0.030) (0.480) (0.477) (0.029)
Immigrants from Non-FSU Countries 0.016 0.007 0.009 0.013 0.011 0.002
(0.127) (0.086) (0.005) (0.115) (0.104) (0.005)
Immigrants from FSU Countries 0.013 0.019 -0.007 0.031 0.021 0.010
(0.112) (0.138) (0.006) (0.173) (0.144) (0.008)
B. High School Outcomes
High School Completion 0.951 0.968 -0.017 0.963 0.960 0.002
(0.216) (0.177) (0.010) (0.190) (0.196) (0.010)
Mean Matriculation Score 70.62 72.56 -1.949 73.430 74.640 -1.210
(23.250) (20.684) (1.113) (21.832) (21.476) (1.091)
Matriculation Certification 0.549 0.591 -0.042 0.636 0.665 -0.029
(0.498) (0.492) (0.030) (0.481) (0.472) (0.031)
University Qualified Matriculation 0.516 0.538 -0.022 0.597 0.618 -0.021
(0.500) (0.499) (0.028) (0.491) (0.486) (0.031)
Observations 1,100 1,081 1,043 1,181
Notes : Columns 1, 2, 4 and 5 present means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of characteristics and outcomes of
students in treatment and control kibbutzim for affected (1999-2000) and unaffected (1995-1996) cohorts of 10th graders.
Columns 3 and 6 present the differences between treatment and control kibbutzim a regression of each characteristics on a
treatment indicator. Standard errors of these differences clustered at the kibbutz level are given in parentheses. Treatment
kibbutzim are those that reformed in 1998-2000. Control kibbutzim are those that did not reform. 
Table A12 : Balancing Tests of Students' Characteristics and Outcomes in Treatment and Control Kibbutzim 
Treatment Kibbutzim : Reformed in 1998-2000; Control Kibbutzim : Did Not Reform 
10th Grade Students 10th Grade Students 
 in 1995 and 1996 in 1999 and 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Linear Trend Model
Time Trend 0.026 0.025 1.610 1.644
(0.008) (0.007) (0.414) (0.378)
Treatment x Time Trend -0.008 -0.005 -0.653 -0.718
(0.011) (0.010) (0.561) (0.512)
Treatment 0.002 - 2.019 -
(0.043) (2.205)
B. Cohort Dummies Model
Treatment x 1994 -0.009 -0.011 4.685 3.892
(0.066) (0.060) (3.368) (3.076)
Treatment x 1995 0.005 0.015 4.144 3.325
(0.065) (0.059) (3.343) (3.055)
Treatment x 1996 0.045 0.052 4.920 3.442
(0.065) (0.059) (3.309) (3.022)
Treatment x 1997 0.064 0.082 1.300 0.955
(0.065) (0.059) (3.328) (3.032)
Treatment x 1998 -0.106 -0.098 -2.511 -3.105
(0.065) (0.059) (3.326) (3.037)
Treatment -0.027 - -2.398 -
(0.047) (2.391)
Kibbutz Fixed-Effects NO YES NO YES
F(  5,   754) =    1.72 F(  5,   620) =    2.29 F(  5,   754) =    1.67 F(  5,   620) =    1.63
Prob > F =    0.1282 Prob > F =    0.0444 Prob > F =    0.1397 Prob > F =    0.1498
Table A13 : Treatment-Control Differences in Pre-Reform Time Trends in Schooling Outcomes, 10th Grade Students in 1993-1998
Treatment Kibbutzim : Reformed in 1998-2000; Control Kibbutzim : Did Not Reform
Matriculation Certification Mean Matriculation Score
Notes : This table presents the results from OLS regressions run at the kibbutz level predicting the proportion of students who received
matriculation certificates (columns 1 and 2) or the mean scores in the matriculation exams (columns 3 and 4) for the cohorts of 10th graders
from 1993 to 1998 (pre reform). In the regressions in Panel A, outcomes are allowed to vary according to a linear time (cohort) trend that
differs in treatment and control kibbutzim. Treatment kibbutzim are those that reformed in 1998-2000. Control kibbutzim are those that did
not reform. In the regressions in Panel B, the difference between treatment and control kibbutzim is allowed to vary freely for each cohort of
students. Cohort dummies are included in the Panel B regressions but their coefficients are not reported. Estimates in columns 2 and 4
include kibbutz fixed effects. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. The number of observarions in each regression is 620. The F




10th Grade Students in 1995-1996 0.056 0.045 0.011
(0.231) (0.208) (0.011)
10th Grade Students in 1999-2000 0.052 0.021 0.031
(0.222) (0.144) (0.010)
Difference -0.005 -0.024 -
(0.010) (0.011)
Table A14 : Treatment-Control and Between-Cohort Differences in Students' Exit Rates From Their 
Kibbutzim
Treatment Kibbutzim : Reformed in 1998-2000; Control Kibbutzim : Did Not Reform
Notes : This table presents exit rates from their kibbutzim of two cohorts (1995-1996 and 1999-2000) of
students in treatment and control kibbutzim. Columns 1 and 2 show means and standard deviations (in
parentheses) of exit rates for the different groups of students. Column 3 shows differences between the groups
and standard errors of the differences clustered at the kibbutz level (in parentheses). Exit is defined as living
in the kibbutz at the start of 10th grade, and living outside the kibbutz by the end of 12th grade. Treatment
kibbutzim are those that reformed in 1998-2000. Control kibbutzim are those that did not reform. 
Treatment Control Difference
(1) (2) (3)
10th Grade Students in 1995-1996 0.056 0.044 0.013
(0.231) (0.204) (0.011)




Table A15 : Treatment-Control and Between-Cohort Differences in Students' Exit Rates From Their 
Kibbutzim
Treatment Kibbutzim : Reformed in 1998-2000; Control Kibbutzim : Reformed in 2001-02
Notes : This table presents exit rates from their kibbutzim of two cohorts (1995-1996 and 1999-2000) of
students in treatment and control kibbutzim. Columns 1 and 2 show means and standard deviations (in
parentheses) of exit rates for the different groups of students. Column 3 shows differences between the groups
and standard errors of the differences clustered at the kibbutz level (in parentheses). Exit is defined as living in
the kibbutz at the start of 10th grade, and living outside the kibbutz by the end of 12th grade. Treatment











(1) (2) (3) (4)
10th Grade Students in 1995-1996 and 1999-2000
Treatment-Control Difference, 1995-1996 -0.015 -1.554 -0.010 -0.008
(0.010) (1.091) (0.025) (0.025)
(0.012) (1.221) (0.031) (0.031)
Treatment-Control Difference, 1999-2000 0.020 2.200 0.032 0.041
(0.011) (1.187) (0.024) (0.025)
(0.014) (1.338) (0.029) (0.030)
Table A16 : Cross-Section Treatment-Control Differences
Notes : This table presents the coefficients of interest in single difference regressions comparing outcomes of
students of the same cohort between treatment kibbutzim (reformed in 1998-2000) and control kibbutzim (reformed
in 2003-04). The dependent variable in column 1 is whether the student completed high school; in column 2 it is
her mean score in the matriculation exams; in column 3 it is whether she received a matriculation certificate; in
column 4 it is whether she received a matriculation certificate that satisfies the requirements for university study.











(1) (2) (3) (4)
Experiment of Interest, 10th Grade Students in 1995-1996 and 1999-2000
Pay Reform 0.052 5.018 0.085 0.09
0.018 1.899 0.04 0.04
0.018 1.984 0.045 0.045
Meal Reform -0.005 -0.729 0.003 0.009
(0.014) (1.519) (0.032) (0.032)
(0.016) (1.604) (0.036) (0.035)
Electricity Reform 0.022 -2.194 -0.107 -0.102
(0.025) (2.931) (0.055) (0.055)
(0.022) (3.154) (0.047) (0.055)
Health Care Reform -0.033 -0.540 -0.048 -0.010
(0.020) (2.141) (0.045) (0.046)
(0.026) (2.788) (0.045) (0.047)
Laundry Reform -0.009 -1.570 -0.028 -0.042
(0.018) (1.908) (0.039) (0.040)
(0.022) (2.422) (0.041) (0.040)
Table A17 : Estimated Coefficients on Four Social Reforms Dummies











(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Experiment of Interest, 10th Grade Students in 1995-1996 and 1999-2000
Cross-Section Regressions
Treatment-Control Difference, 1995-1996 -0.013 -1.005 -0.004 0.000
(0.010) (1.080) (0.025) (0.025)
(0.011) (1.123) (0.031) (0.031)
Treatment-Control Difference, 1999-2000 0.030 3.181 0.048 0.054
(0.012) (1.365) (0.028) (0.029)
(0.014) (1.489) (0.034) (0.035)
Difference in Differences Regressions
Simple Difference in Differences 0.033 3.112 0.029 0.040
(0.015) (1.630) (0.035) (0.036)
(0.016) (1.517) (0.035) (0.035)
Controlled Difference in Differences 0.048 4.501 0.076 0.082
(0.017) (1.846) (0.039) (0.039)
(0.020) (1.985) (0.042) (0.043)
B. Control Experiment, 10th Grade Students in 1995-1996 and 1997-1998 
Difference in Differences Regressions
Simple Difference in Differences 0.011 0.213 -0.016 -0.025
(0.014) (1.542) (0.035) (0.036)
(0.015) (1.527) (0.036) (0.036)
Controlled Difference in Differences 0.010 -0.026 0.001 -0.016
(0.016) (1.621) (0.036) (0.036)
(0.017) (1.645) (0.034) (0.035)
Table A17a: Cross-Section Treatment-Control Differences and Difference in Differences Estimates 
(Including  Four  Other Social Reforms as Controls)
Notes : 4 other reforms are controlled for: meal refor, electricity reform, health care reform, and laundry reform. See











(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Intensity of Exposure
Three Years of Full Reform 0.048 4.116 0.068 0.074
(N=470) (0.020) (2.090) (0.045) (0.046)
(0.021) (2.159) (0.047) (0.048)
Two Years of Full Reform 0.066 5.164 0.038 0.068
(N=341) (0.016) (1.700) (0.040) (0.040)
(0.017) (1.849) (0.047) (0.046)
One Year of Full Reform 0.030 2.311 0.014 -0.008
(N=315) (0.017) (1.711) (0.039) (0.040)
(0.017) (1.736) (0.041) (0.041)
Up to Three Years of Partial Reform 0.013 0.907 0.027 0.021
(N=2484) (0.012) (1.291) (0.029) (0.029)
(0.014) (1.196) (0.028) (0.030)
F-statistic 4.914 2.171 0.690 1.323
P-value 0.001 0.075 0.600 0.264
B. Intensity of Exposure: Three years of partial versus full
Three Years of Full Reform 0.055 4.171 0.098 0.104
(N=470) (0.021) (2.199) (0.046) (0.047)
(0.023) (2.308) (0.051) (0.050)
Three Years of Partial Reform 0.015 0.936 0.031 0.026
(N=2484) (0.012) (1.300) (0.029) (0.029)
(0.014) (1.206) (0.027) (0.030)
F-statistic 2.951 1.641 1.863 2.191
P-value 0.055 0.197 0.159 0.115
Table A18 : Controlled Difference-in-Differences Estimates by Intensity of Exposure to Full or Partial Pay Reform 
Cohorts : 1995-2000; Kibbutzim : Reformed 1998-2004; Controlling for 4 Social Reforms
Notes : This table presents the results of difference-in-differences regressions comparing students who spent different
proportions of their high school years under a partial or full pay reform. The included cohorts are students who were in 10th
grade between 1995 and 2000; included kibbutzim are those that reformed in 1998-2004. The value of N for each intensity of
treatment is the number of students who faced that intensity of treatment. Panel A presents results from regressions that allow
the effect of the reform to differ by number of years under a full pay reform, or whether the student faced a partial pay reform. 
Panel B regressions duplicate panel A regressions, but omit students who experienced a change in pay system while at high
school. In each case, estimation includes cohort dummies, kibbutz fixed effects, and the demographic controls gender, father's
and mother's education, number of siblings, and a set of origin dummies (Africa/Asia, Europe/America, immigrants from FSU,
Ethiopia and other countries). Robust standard errors and clustered standard errors respectively are presented in parentheses.











(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Intensity of Exposure
Three Years of Any Reform 0.055 7.478 0.091 0.086
(N=602) (0.019) (2.035) (0.044) (0.044)
(0.019) (2.010) (0.046) (0.046)
Two Years of Any Reform 0.043 4.132 0.062 0.052
(N=516) (0.015) (1.606) (0.034) (0.035)
(0.015) (1.599) (0.039) (0.040)
One Year of Any Reform 0.044 2.360 0.016 0.041
(N=544) (0.013) (1.307) (0.028) (0.029)
(0.011) (1.264) (0.032) (0.031)
F-statistic 5.851 4.615 1.760 1.183
P-value 0.001 0.004 0.159 0.320
B. Intensity of Exposure: Three years versus none
Three Years of Any Reform 0.061 6.883 0.080 0.060
(N=602) (0.021) (2.345) (0.050) (0.051)
(0.023) (2.603) (0.059) (0.060)
F-statistic 6.982 6.992 1.812 0.997
P-value 0.009 0.009 0.181 0.320
Table A18a : Controlled Difference-in-Differences Estimates by Intensity of Exposure to Any Pay Reform 
Cohorts : 1995-2000; Kibbutzim : Reformed 1998-2004; Controlling for 4 Social Reforms
Notes : This table presents the results of difference-in-differences regressions comparing students who spent different proportions
of their high school years under a pay reform. The included cohorts are students who were in 10th grade between 1995 and 2000; 
included kibbutzim are those that reformed in 1998-2004. The value of N for each intensity of treatment is the number of
students who faced that intensity of treatment. The Panel A regressions interact dummies for the number of years each treated
student spent in high school under a differential pay system with the treatment cohort dummy. Panel A presents results from
regressions that allow the effect of the reform to differ by number of  years under any type of pay reform. 
Panel B regressions duplicate panel A regressions, but omit students who spent one or two high school years under a differential
pay system. In each case, estimation includes cohort dummies, kibbutz fixed effects, and the demographic controls gender,
father's and mother's education, number of siblings, and a set of origin dummies (Africa/Asia, Europe/America, immigrants from
FSU, Ethiopia and other countries). Robust standard errors and clustered standard errors respectively are presented in
parentheses. The F-statistic and P-value are reported for the hypothesis that all the coefficients on treatment intensity are jointly











(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Sample Stratification by Mother's Education
Low
Three Years of Full Reform 0.044 8.255 0.196 0.168
(0.033) (3.412) (0.066) (0.067)
(0.039) (3.504) (0.073) (0.073)
Three Years of Partial Reform 0.026 2.792 0.109 0.085
(0.033) (3.603) (0.069) (0.068)
(0.035) (3.847) (0.065) (0.062)
{0.964} {74.57} {0.656} {0.619}
0.216 1.826 1.344 1.211
0.642 0.177 0.246 0.271
High
Three Years of Full Reform 0.008 -0.011 -0.034 0.023
(0.024) (2.630) (0.058) (0.059)
(0.023) (2.645) (0.059) (0.060)
Three Years of Partial Reform 0.006 -0.246 -0.047 -0.036
(0.027) (2.906) (0.063) (0.064)
(0.028) (2.784) (0.070) (0.074)
{0.943} {68.64} {0.515} {0.476}
0.002 0.006 0.037 0.716
0.965 0.940 0.847 0.397
0.773 3.680 6.810 2.597
0.379 0.055 0.009 0.107
0.217 0.431 2.789 1.646
0.641 0.512 0.095 0.200
B. Sample Stratification by Father's Education
Low
Three Years of Full Reform 0.026 9.533 0.207 0.193
(0.035) (3.583) (0.068) (0.069)
(0.044) (4.166) (0.072) (0.071)
Three Years of Partial Reform 0.023 0.916 -0.018 -0.040
(0.036) (3.960) (0.072) (0.071)
(0.045) (4.233) (0.071) (0.074)
{0.965} {75.19} {0.678} {0.645}
0.007 3.895 8.671 9.429
0.934 0.049 0.003 0.002
High
Three Years of Full Reform 0.028 -0.115 -0.006 0.033
(0.024) (2.525) (0.058) (0.058)
(0.020) (2.333) (0.062) (0.063)
Three Years of Partial Reform 0.016 3.065 0.091 0.096
(0.024) (2.599) (0.062) (0.063)
(0.022) (2.465) (0.066) (0.068)
{0.940} {67.69} {0.484} {0.440}
0.160 1.213 2.122 0.851
0.689 0.271 0.145 0.356
0.002 4.825 5.707 3.167
0.966 0.028 0.017 0.075
0.021 0.205 1.325 2.063
0.884 0.650 0.250 0.151
Table A19 : Controlled Difference-in-Differences Estimates by Intensity of Exposure to Differential Pay, Sub-Samples by 
Parental Education
Full Reform = Partial Reform 
(F-statistic and P-value reported)
Three Years of Full Reform = Three Years of Partial 
Reform 
(F-statistic and P-value reported)
Full Reform Low = Full Reform High 
(F-statistic and P-value reported)
Partial Reform Low = Partial Reform High 
(F-statistic and P-value reported)
Three Years of Full Reform = Three Years of Partial 
Reform 
(F-statistic and P-value reported)
Full Reform Low = Full Reform High 
(F-statistic and P-value reported)
Partial Reform Low = Partial Reform High 
(F-statistic and P-value reported)
Notes : This table presents the results of difference-in-differences regressions comparing students in treatment (reformed 1998-
2000) and control (reformed 2003-04) kibbutzim who are treated (10th grade in 1999-2000) and untreated (10th grade in 1995-96),
where the treatment effect varies by whther the student experienced a full or partial differential pay system while at high school,
stratified by mother's (Panel A) or father's (Panel B) education. The regressions omit students who experienced a change in pay
system while at high school.  
Estimation includes cohort dummies, kibbutz fixed effects, and the demographic controls gender, father's and mother's education, 
number of siblings, and a set of origin dummies (Africa/Asia, Europe/America, immigrants from FSU, Ethiopia and other 
countries).  Robust and clustered standard errors respectively are presented in parentheses. The means of all outcomes for each sub-
group are presented in curly brackets (below the reported standard errors of each parameter). F-tests for coefficients' equality are 
presented for the following: Within group: three years of full reform = three years of partial reform; Between groups: Full\Partial 
reform group 1 = Full\Partial reform group 2.  
Full Reform = Partial Reform 











(1) (2) (3) (4)
Male
Three Years of Full Reform 0.042 6.017 0.097 0.096
(0.030) (3.215) (0.063) (0.063)
(0.034) (3.480) (0.077) (0.075)
Three Years of Partial Reform 0.018 1.085 0.028 0.007
(0.034) (3.464) (0.067) (0.067)
(0.037) (3.428) (0.063) (0.060)
{0.965} {74.83} {0.651} {0.621}
0.402 1.675 0.915 1.553
0.526 0.196 0.339 0.213
Female
Three Years of Full Reform 0.008 2.832 0.035 0.048
(0.026) (2.707) (0.061) (0.063)
(0.027) (2.632) (0.070) (0.073)
Three Years of Partial Reform 0.017 2.201 0.045 0.037
(0.021) (2.698) (0.063) (0.064)
(0.023) (3.318) (0.068) (0.070)
{0.944} {68.87} {0.532} {0.485}
0.106 0.042 0.020 0.023
0.745 0.838 0.887 0.880
0.726 0.574 0.490 0.292
0.394 0.449 0.484 0.589
0.002 0.065 0.034 0.112
0.966 0.799 0.855 0.738
Notes : This table presents the results of difference-in-differences regressions comparing students in treatment (reformed 1998-
2000) and control (reformed 2003-04) kibbutzim who are treated (10th grade in 1999-2000) and untreated (10th grade in 1995-
96), where the treatment effect varies by whther the student experienced a full or partial differential pay system while at high
school, stratified by gender. The regressions omit students who experienced a change in pay system while at high school.  
Estimation includes cohort dummies, kibbutz fixed effects, and the demographic controls gender, father's and mother's 
education, number of siblings, and a set of origin dummies (Africa/Asia, Europe/America, immigrants from FSU, Ethiopia and 
other countries).  Robust and clustered standard errors respectively are presented in parentheses. The means of all outcomes for 
each sub-group are presented in curly brackets (below the reported standard errors of each parameter). F-tests for coefficients' 
equality are presented for the following: Within group: three years of full reform = three years of partial reform; Between 
groups: Full\Partial reform group 1 = Full\Partial reform group 2.  
Table A20 : Controlled Difference-in-Differences Estimates by Intensity of Exposure to Differential Pay, Sub-Samples 
by Gender
Full Reform = Partial Reform 
(F-statistic and P-value reported)
Three Years of Full Reform = Three Years of Partial 
Reform 
(F-statistic and P-value reported)
Full Reform Boys = Full Reform Girls 
(F-statistic and P-value reported)
Partial Reform Boys = Partial Reform Girls 











(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A.Full Sample
Controlled DID 0.040 -0.027 0.068 0.028 0.045 -0.153 0.168 0.049
(0.034) (0.033) (0.035) (0.015) (0.148) (0.132) (0.112) (0.034)
(0.036) (0.030) (0.038) (0.014) (0.167) (0.139) (0.117) (0.032)
B. Boys
Controlled DID 0.060 0.031 0.073 0.028 0.234 -0.045 0.254 0.039
(0.051) (0.047) (0.049) (0.028) (0.206) (0.179) (0.143) (0.026)
(0.052) (0.046) (0.046) (0.020) (0.234) (0.184) (0.138) (0.025)
C. Girls
Controlled DID 0.031 -0.088 0.080 0.032 -0.138 -0.274 0.128 0.053
(0.047) (0.048) (0.053) (0.024) (0.223) (0.202) (0.180) (0.064)
(0.048) (0.048) (0.061) (0.021) (0.239) (0.194) (0.182) (0.059)
Table A21 : The Effect of the Pay Reform on Post Secondary Schooling (Limited to Age 30)
Enrollment in Post High School Education Post High School Years of Schooling
Notes : This table presents the results of difference-in-differences regressions examining post-high school education outcomes, comparing students in treatment (reformed
1998-2000) and control (reformed 2003-04) kibbutzim who are treated (10th grade in 1999-2000) and untreated (10th grade in 1995-96). The Panel A regressions present
results for the full sample, panel B for boys only, and panel C for girls only. The dependent variables in columns 1-4 are dummy variables that receive the value 1 if the student
was ever enrolled and 0 otherwise; the dependent variables in columns 5-8 are counts of the number of post high school years of schooling obtained by the student. Robust and 











(1) (2) (3) (4)
10th Grade Students in 1995-2000
Three Years of Reform in High School & At 
Least One Year in Middle School
0.043 5.952 0.073 0.102
(0.026) (2.631) (0.053) (0.058)
Three Years of Reform in High School & No 
Years in Middle School
0.044 5.272 0.0471 0.045
(0.020) (2.029) (0.047) (0.046)
Two Years of Reform in High School 0.036 2.706 0.044 0.044
(0.017) (1.464) (0.039) (0.039)
One Year of Reform in High School 0.042 1.908 0.023 0.050
(0.014) (1.520) (0.034) (0.035)
Reform Occurred Within One Year of 
Graduation
0.006 -0.429 0.024 0.019
(0.013) (1.470) (0.031) (0.031)
Table A22 : Treatment-Control Difference-in-Differences Estimates 
Indicators for years in a reformed kibbutz during high school, allowing for anticipation effects
Notes : The dependent variable in column 1 is whether the student completed high school; in column 2 it is her mean
score in the matriculation exams; in column 3 it is whether she received a matriculation certificate; in column 4 it is
whether she received a matriculation certificate that satisfies the requirements for university study. The coefficients
are from difference-in-differences regressions comparing students in treatment and control kibbutzim who are
untreated or treated to different degrees (10th grade in 1995-2000). The coefficients presented are on indicator
variables for treatment intensity, measured by years of exposure to the reform. The difference-in-differences
estimation (equation (2) in the text) includes cohort dummies, kibbutz fixed effects, and the demographic controls
gender, father's and mother's education, number of siblings, and a set of ethnic dummies (origin from Africa/Asia,
Europe/America, immigrants from FSU, Ethiopia and other countries). Robust standard errors are presented in
parentheses.   
